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Abstract 
 
Malicious insiders’ difficult-to-detect activities pose serious threats to the 
intelligence community (IC) when these activities go undetected.  A novel 
approach that integrates the results of social network analysis, role-based access 
monitoring, and semantic analysis of insiders’ communications as evidence for 
evaluation by a risk assessor is being tested on an IC simulation.  A semantic 
analysis, by our proven Natural Language Processing (NLP) system, of the 
insider’s text-based communications produces conceptual representations that are 
clustered and compared on the expected vs. observed scope. The determined risk 
level produces an input to a risk analysis algorithm that is merged with outputs 
from the system’s social network analysis and role-based monitoring modules. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Natural Language Processing (NLP) has proven successful in a range of applications of 
significance to the intelligence community (IC). Most of these applications support the IC’s 
need for improved representation of, and access to, large amounts of textual information for 
tasks such as information retrieval, question-answering, cross-language information 
retrieval, cross-document summarization, and information extraction. In the research we are 
herein reporting, we adapt our proven NLP capabilities to provide fine-grained content 
representation and analysis of text-based communications in a novel application – detecting 
insider threats via semantic analysis of text-based artifacts either produced by or accessed 
by IC analysts.   
 
Our full insider threat solution integrates evidence from social network analysis and role-
based access monitoring of system usage with our semantic analysis of insiders’ cyber 
communications as inputs to a risk analysis algorithm that assesses these inputs and 
produces an indication of the potential risk of an insider threat within the organization. This 
research is being conducted as part of ARDA’s Information Assurance for the Intelligence 
Community Program, and therefore, it is being modeled on and tested in a simulated IC 
malicious insider threat scenario developed by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) on our 
project with years of experience with the community. A malicious insider is someone who, 
while a valid user of IC systems, decides to perform unauthorized malicious acts, including 
sharing of information with groups unfriendly to the US. The goal of this ARDA program is 
to develop solutions for efficiently detecting and monitoring such unwanted behaviors. 
While the IC is the main focus of our development efforts, the banking and securities 
industries have the same need to recognize potential insider threats and will be able to 
utilize this model and methodology for distinguishing between normal and abnormal cyber 
behavior of their employees. 
 
To accomplish our goal, we are developing and testing an Insider Threat Model that 
integrates Context, Role, and Semantics, here defined as:  Context – the tasks the analyst is 
assigned;  Role – the analyst’s assigned job functions within that context, and;  Semantics – 
the content of the information produced or accessed by the analyst. Given these inputs, the 
model will detect levels of insider threat risk by comparing expected cyber behaviors 
against observed cyber behaviors. This paper reports on the Semantic Analysis module. 
 
Operational Scenario 
 
Intelligence analysts operate within a mission-based context, focused mainly on specific 
topics of interest (TOIs) and geo-political areas of interest (AOIs) that they are assigned. 
The role the analyst plays dictates the TOI/AOI, organizational relationships, 
communication patterns, intelligence products and information systems needed, and the 
intelligence work products created, thereby the need for monitoring Context, Role, and 
Semantics. The demonstration scenario we will be testing within is based on an 
organizational network of analysts working in various groups. Our scenario is based on a 
fictitious government agency with fictitious information targets. However, our SMEs will 
ensure that the scenario will be representative of the information assurance problem of 
malicious insider threats in the U.S. Intelligence Community.  
 
Related work  
 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no account of the integrated social context, role, and 
semantics approach that we are taking. While some projects have addressed these 
dimensions individually, most research appears to be focused on cyber threat and cyber 
security. When semantics has been utilized, it is applied to describe the role-based access 
policy of an organization (RAND, 1999; Upadhyaya et al., 2001). In related work, a 
research project by Raskin et al. (2002) aims to use a natural language-based ontology to 
scan texts for indicators of possible intellectual property leakage.  
 
The 2003 NSF / NIJ Symposium on Intelligence and Security Informatics marked an 
increased interest in the research community in applying linguistic analysis to the problems 
of cyber security. Stolfo et al. (2003) mined subject lines of email messages for patterns 
typical for particular user groups (e.g. software developers vs. the legal department). 
Patman & Thompson (2003) reported on the implementation of a personal name 
disambiguation module that utilizes knowledge of cultural contexts. Burgoon et al. (2003) 
looked for linguistic indicators of deception in interview transcripts. Zhou et al. (2003) 
conducted a longitudinal study of linguistic cues of deception in email messages. Zheng et 
al. (2003) compared machine-learning algorithms on the task of recognizing the authorship 
of email messages, and evaluated the efficiency of using different semantic features such as 
style markers, structural features, and content-specific features. Sreenath et al. (2003) 
employed latent semantic analysis to reconstruct users’ original queries from their online 
browsing paths and applied this technique to detecting malicious (e.g. terrorist) trends.  
 
The novelty of our approach is in both the problem and the scope. The patterns that we are 
seeking to detect may not look malicious. In fact, they may look perfectly legitimate but, 
when considering the user’s role and context of their assignment (i.e. topics and geo-
political focus), they indicate that the insider’s activities are out of range of “expected 
behavior”. Our task is to assess the semantic distance between the content of the documents 
that the insider is currently accessing and creating and the expected content, given the 
analyst’s assigned TOI and AOI. For this purpose, concept-based semantic analysis will be 
applied to the wide range of textual documents that analysts use and produce while working 
on a task, e.g. documents provided by other organizations or from internal collections, 
email communication, or database or Internet query logs.  
 
 
Approach        
 
The insider threat scenario described above presents the following problem amenable to the 
semantic analysis module of our system. Given the set of textual data available 
electronically and ranging in genre from news articles to analyst reports, official 
documents, email messages, query logs, and so on, the system should be able to identify the 
TOI / AOI mentioned in the documents and compare them against the expected TOI and 
AOI. In other words, the task is to detect an outlier, i.e. a TOI / AOI, which is significantly 
different from the expected ones.  
 
Our approach is based on a number of assumptions developed in the course of our talks 
with members of the IC. First, we assume that analysts are assigned relatively long-term 
tasks and dedicate most of their work time to it.
1
 Next, we assume, there may be more than 
one analyst who is assigned the same main topic and that each would then work on 
particular subtopics. Finally, we assume that the analysts work with documents and engage 
in email communication on topics related to their assigned task. We can also expect that the 
analysts working on subtopics of the same main topic would access different, but topically 
related, documents. Given the above assumptions, we can expect that clustering documents 
that the analysts work with would yield a larger cluster(s) containing on-topic documents, 
and a few smaller clusters of off-topic documents. Further, we can train a clustering model 
on the dataset containing mainly on-topic documents. The topical description of a cluster 
will be generated from the n most frequent concepts in the clustered documents. Then, we 
can assess whether the documents accessed or created by the analyst fall within the scope of 
on-topic cluster(s) or whether they are significantly far from such topical cluster(s). 
 
We will experimentally compare and select from the range of available hierarchical 
clustering methods
2
 the most appropriate one for our task of developing a model of 
expected TOI/AOI for the documents that the analyst accesses/generates. Then, each new 
document will be assessed in terms of its semantic distance from the existing cluster(s). As 
a result, the document will be merged with on-topic cluster(s), or existing off-topic 
cluster(s), or will start a new off-topic cluster. It is important to note that not every off-topic 
cluster should raise an alert flag. First, clustering algorithms can generate sporadic clusters. 
Also, realistically, analysts cannot be expected to work on their assigned topic 100% of 
their time. Finally, the emergent topic can be a legitimate development in the analyst’s 
work. Therefore, the system will check the semantic distance between the off-topic cluster 
and the on-topic cluster(s), and also the size of the off-topic cluster. When both parameters 
exceed thresholds, the semantic analysis module emits an indicator to the insider threat 
monitoring application. A human (e.g. an information assurance engineer) can then review 
the indicators for their relevancy. Documents assessed as being on-topic will be added to 
the model; thus, adjusting the semantics of the expected TOI/AOI and the on-topic cluster 
parameters. 
 
We intend to boost the efficacy of the clustering methods by use of multiple ontologies, 
which will enable mapping of individual terms and locations to appropriate categories and, 
thus, will reduce the high dimensionality of data
3
 and, more importantly, contribute to the 
conceptual coverage of the resulting clusters.  
 
                                                 
1 This assumption does not cover analysts working on time-critical requests that need to be turned in 
within a couple of hours. Such analysts are expected to change topics quickly. A different TOI / AOI 
model would be needed for them. 
2 See Ward, 1963; Zhao & Karypis, 2002 for details on methods. 
3 Known to negatively affect computational effectiveness of clustering algorithms (Hotho et al., 2003) 
 
 
Resources 
 
Data 
One of the challenges of this project is to develop a test collection of questions / topics and 
related documents for training and testing to adequately represent the spectrum of textual 
data accessed / generated during the analyst’s work processes. Such data collection is bound 
to be diverse in both, format (such as txt, html, doc, tabular) and genre (e.g. formal 
documents, analytic reports, online news stories, email messages). Being aware of the 
constraints on data procurement from operational settings, we gathered resources that 
would best fit the context of the IC. The resulting collection, discussed in greater detail 
below, is an example of collaboration and sharing among different research teams involved 
in ARDA and DARPA funded projects.  
 
The analysts’ tasks were modeled on scenarios developed by Center for Non-Proliferation 
Studies (CNS)
4
 experts for use in ARDA’s AQUAINT (Advanced Question and Answering 
for Intelligence) Program. We also make use of the scenario-based questions generated at 
the 2003 ARDA-NRRC workshop on Scenario-Based Question-Answering (Liddy, 2003). 
A scenario consists of a question (i.e. particular task that the analyst is charged with) and a 
set of sub-questions, thus, modeling the analyst’s decomposition of the main question into a 
set of contextually related sub-topics and posing them iteratively against the appropriate 
information resources (Figure 1).  
 
Main Question/Topic 
Despite having complete access, to this day UN inspections have been unable to 
find any biological weapons, or remnants thereof, in Iraq. Why has it proven so 
difficult to discover hard information about Iraq’s biological weapons program 
and what are the implications of these difficulties for the international biological 
arms control regime? 
 
Question Decomposition / Subtopics (selected from 15) 
1. What does it take to determine/find signatures of a biological weapons program? 
2. What are UN capabilities and procedures for inspection? 
3. Are they looking for the right thing?   
4. Where are they likely to be?   
5. Signature of the inspections: how predictable were they?  Did they lend 
themselves to deception? 
6. What is the Iraqi denial and deception capability?  How much effort is involved 
in hiding it? What evidence is available? 
 
Sources to Answer the Question(s)
5
 
• Arms control agreements 
• UN databases, guidelines, and procedures 
• UNSCOM report 
• CNS data for weapons info 
• Office of Technology Assessment reports 
• Foreign press reports 
• General search 
• Talk to inspectors 
• Geospatial sources 
Figure 1. Sample AQUAINT scenario 
                                                 
4
 http://cns.miis.edu/ 
5 Italicizing indicates data amenable to semantic analysis 
 
From our conversations with intelligence analysts, we have learned that these scenarios 
fairly accurately represent actual analysts’ tasks. 
 
Another benefit of the AQUAINT scenarios is that they were developed under the premise 
that much of the needed information can be found in the CNS collection, in particular, in: 
datasets on nuclear weapons and missile proliferation; country profiles for North Korea and 
China; NIS Nuclear Profiles; a Nuclear Trafficking Database; the news archive on CBW / 
WMD. The resources are of various genres: news (including translations); analytic reports 
by various agencies, and; treaties. Our data set also includes a collection of online news 
topically related to the CNS data, compiled by the AQUAINT team at SUNY-Albany
6
.  
 
Ontology 
In the semantic analysis approach, rather than using the literal words in texts, we develop 
algorithms to augment the document terms selected for clustering with appropriate 
concepts. Given that the focus will be on TOI and AOI, we needed an ontology for the 
nonproliferation domain, as well as a gazetteer. 
  
Through collaboration with ISI / SAIC / Ontolingua, we obtained access to an ontology of 
CNS concepts
7
, which also includes topics from non-CNS knowledge bases on terrorism. 
We will adjust this ontology to incorporate our currently employed taxonomy. Figure 2 
illustrates the current semantic mapping of the terms sarin and mustard gas to a type cweap 
(chemical weapon) and its augmentation with CNS topics (WMD, weapons).  
 
cbw092502 
.. the regime has accumulated substantial stockpiles of deadly liquid agents such as 
mustard gas, and ominous nerve agents, such as sarin and VX, the report said. 
entity = mustard_gas|NN 
type  = cweap 
 Cat = WMD 
Top Cat = weapon 
 
entity = sarin|NN 
type  = cweap 
Cat = WMD  
              Top Cat = weapon 
 
Figure 2. Example of term-mapping 
 
For the conceptual organization of AOI, we will utilize the SPAWAR Gazetteer, also 
developed under the AQUAINT Program. It combines resources of four publicly available 
gazetteers (NGA
8
; USGS; CIA World Factbook; DARPA’s TIPSTER Program), and is 
dynamically updated. The gazetteer uses a single comprehensive categorization scheme 
based on the Alexandria Digital Library thesaurus
9
. When tested on text annotation tasks, it 
was shown to cover 90% of geographic references in texts.  
 
Preliminary Example 
 
To exemplify our methods, consider the following example that we developed in order to 
familiarize ourselves with the data collection we were assembling. We selected a small set 
(five) of documents from the North Korea collection compiled by CNS. All documents 
                                                 
6 http://www.hitiqa.albany.edu/index.html  
7 http://ontolingua.stanford.edu. 
8
 National Geographic Intelligence Agency; former name is National Imagery and Mapping Agency 
9www.alexandria.ucsb.edu/~lhill/FeatureTypes 
were of a similar genre, namely, chronology of proliferation events. Two documents came 
from the Missile subset, and three documents came from the Chemical subset. We ran the 
documents through CNLP’s text processor and analyzed the extracted entities and named 
entities
10
. The analysis led to a few important observations. First, selecting only entities to 
represent the conceptual scope of the document reduces it by about 3/4
th
, and further 
limiting to the named entities cut it to about 1/10
th
 of its original size (Table 1): 
 
Tokens Doc92 Doc95 Doc47_96 Doc97_00 Doc01_02 
Words 5356 4102 2736 1787 690 
Entities + Named Entities 1399 1136 748 462 181 
Named Entities only 420 405 252 161 81 
 
Table 1. Count of document terms   
 
Second, using a gazetteer to resolve individual location names to their upper level 
geographic concept appears beneficial for identifying important AOIs. For instance, out of 
39 Russia-related place names in Doc92, 23 were literally Russia[n]. The rest (one third) 
constituted city names (Moscow – 11, Miass – 4) and a region name (Ural). Another 
example: of 13 mentions of South Korea, 8 (two thirds) referred to Seoul. Assuming that 
locations are almost exclusively proper names, we estimated AOI frequencies against the 
named entities only. Table 2 shows prevalent AOIs (in %) for the two Missile documents.  
 
AOI Doc92 Doc95 
North Korea 29.05 19.01 
South Korea 3.1 4.44 
United States 4.29 4.94 
Syria 6.19 0 
Iran 8.57 4.94 
Russia 9.29 .25 
 
Table 2. AOI frequency for Missile documents  
 
Next, we wanted to compare the topicality of Missile vs. Chemical documents. Table 3 
shows TOI frequency across all five documents. Obviously, Doc92 and Doc95 focus on the 
Missile topic, whereas the other three documents mainly discuss Chemical/Biological 
Weapons. Again, the concept-based approach seems promising. For example, out of 174 
Missile-related terms in Doc92, 131 were literal missile[s]. The document also contained 40 
mentions of a topically important term, Scud (a ballistic missile); including 23 cases where 
the term was used just as a proper name. Applying the TOI ontology would group these and 
other
11
 terms under the Missile concept, thus, increasing its frequency by 24.7%
12
.  
 
TOI Doc92 Doc95 Doc47_96 Doc97_00 Doc01_02 
Missile 12.44 14.35 3.21 2.6 1.66 
Chem/Bio .07 .7 4.95 5.19 6.63 
 
Table 3. TOI frequency for Missile and Chemical documents  
                                                 
10 Extracted entities include nouns (missile) and noun phrases (biological warhead), as well as named 
entities, which are proper names (China, Scud). 
11 Such as: launcher, gun, nuclear, Nodong (a proper name for the nuclear missile) 
12 For Doc95, the TOI frequency would be boosted by 31.5% 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This project further extends the idea of combining NLP and machine learning (clustering) 
techniques to an application in the field of information security. This merging presents a 
few challenges, as well as potential areas of contribution, to the problem of knowledge 
acquisition. First, the majority of the prior research focused on a particular genre (news 
stories, or email messages, or query logs). Our data collection combines various genres, 
differing in style, syntax, and semantics
13
. We will, therefore, be enhancing our existing 
NLP tools to deal with genre specifics at the term extraction, term mapping, and 
term/concept-weighting stages
14
. Next, we will further investigate benefits and issues 
related to an ontology-driven approach to identifying important topical structures in large 
and stylistically diverse datasets. 
 
While this is a nascent project, we believe that the application area, the approach, and the 
model described herein should be of interest to researchers in the area of insider threats as 
well as other NLP teams dealing with analogous situations. 
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